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INTRODUCTION 
A vehicle on a public thoroughfare is observed driving erratically 
and careening across the roadway. After the vehicle strikes another pas-
senger car and comes to a stop, the responding officer notices in the driv-
er the telltale symptoms of intoxication—bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, 
and a distinct odor of intoxicants. On these facts, a lawfully-procured 
warrant authorizing the extraction of the driver’s blood is obtained. 
However, the document fails to circumscribe the manner and variety of 
testing that may be performed on the sample. Does this lack of particu-
larity render the warrant constitutionally infirm as a mandate for chemi-
cal analysis of the blood? And, more broadly speaking, is there reason to 
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posit that testing of the blood is a distinct Fourth Amendment event rela-
tive to its initial procurement? 
This Note—against prevailing trends in national search and seizure 
jurisprudence—answers both of the preceding questions in the affirma-
tive. In reaching these conclusions, I explore a novel “testing-as-search” 
paradigm that rebuts longstanding presumptions in Fourth Amendment 
case law. In essence, I use this analytical template to argue that DUI de-
fendants (among others) retain a reasonable, ongoing privacy interest in 
their blood once it has been extracted as evidence in a prosecution. As a 
necessary corollary to this thesis, I also submit that police should not ex-
ploit chemical analysis of a defendant’s blood in the absence of a warrant 
narrowly tailoring the scope of testing that may be performed. 
This work proceeds in several parts. Part I begins with a cursory re-
cital of the Supreme Court’s search and seizure jurisprudence, elucidat-
ing familiar principles of Fourth Amendment law. Part II then proceeds 
to examine the Court’s case law as it relates to the procurement and 
analysis of biological samples, such as blood, via search warrant. Part III 
surveys federal and state decisions that offer competing perspectives on 
what law enforcement officials are entitled to do with blood samples 
once they have been lawfully extracted. Part IV provides an overview of 
Washington State’s Martines decision. Part V introduces the testing-as-
search paradigm to contend that, given the sui generis nature of blood, 
legitimate privacy interests are being compromised under a construct of 
the Fourth Amendment that fails to distinguish between biological and 
nonbiological evidence. Accordingly, it contemplates certain remedial 
measures in the issuance of search warrants intended to curb the limitless 
and unaccountable testing of biological evidence. Finally, Part VI briefly 
touches upon the phenomenon of DNA databanks to illustrate the stakes 
associated with continued adherence to an approach that gives law en-
forcement unjustified latitude in analyzing a defendant’s blood.  
I. BASIC TENETS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
It is well settled that searches conducted outside the judicial pro-
cess, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are generally re-
garded as per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.1 Of course, 
a defendant can only invoke this protection when legitimate privacy in-
terests are imperiled. As Justice Harlan observed in his oft-cited concur-
rence in Katz v. United States, the Fourth Amendment circumscribes a 
state’s conduct only when an individual meets a “twofold requirement”: 
first, the defendant must “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of 
                                                        
 1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971). 
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privacy,” and secondly, that “expectation [must] be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”2 Perhaps the most explicit guid-
ance in Katz as to the reasonableness of a privacy expectation was the 
pronouncement that “what a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”3 This basic two-dimensional inquiry provides the essential 
constitutional paradigm through which most Fourth Amendment chal-
lenges are construed. 
Once a defendant prevails under the Katz threshold, other constitu-
tional principles dictate the manner in which a search warrant must be 
composed in order to pass muster. The Supreme Court has observed that 
“indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 
‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing 
and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”4 General warrants “do not 
specify the place or sphere of a search, thereby granting unrestricted dis-
cretion to executing officers”;5 as such, they are categorically prohibited 
under the Constitution.6 The problem posed by the general warrant is not 
precisely interpreted as merely one of intrusion, but “a general, explora-
tory rummaging in a person’s belongings” that the framers sought to 
guard against.7 The Fourth Amendment addresses this problem by requir-
ing a particular description of the things to be seized.8 This crucial ele-
ment of each warrant “makes general searches . . . impossible and pre-
vents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to 
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer execut-
ing the warrant.”9 
II. GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON TESTING OF BLOOD 
SAMPLES 
Within the particularized realm of criminal prosecutions involving 
the withdrawal of blood from a defendant’s person, the Supreme Court 
has “long recognized that a ‘compelled intrusio[n] into the body for 
blood to be analyzed for alcohol content’ must be deemed a Fourth 
                                                        
 2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 3. Id. at 351. 
 4. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). 
 5. The Honorable M. Blane Michael, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
Madison Lecture: Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth 
(Oct. 20, 2009), in 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 925 (2010). 
 6. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). 
 7. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 
192, 196 (1927)). 
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Amendment search.”10 However, not only is the case law substantiating 
this tradition relatively sparse, but there is even less authority from which 
to infer the Court’s willingness to treat the chemical analysis of blood as 
a distinct Fourth Amendment event. 
The seminal decision for purposes of this discussion is Schmerber 
v. California.11 In Schmerber, the Court reasoned that because “[s]earch 
warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,” a less strin-
gent requirement would be implausible “where intrusions into the human 
body are concerned.”12 Moreover, the Court stressed that the importance 
of requiring authorization by a neutral and detached magistrate before a 
law enforcement officer can “invade another’s body in search of evi-
dence of guilt is indisputable and great.”13 
The Court in Schmerber nonetheless proceeded to uphold the con-
stitutionality of a blood draw from a DUI defendant under circumstances 
where the law enforcement officer had failed to secure a warrant before-
hand.14 It did so by justifying the extraction on a well-established excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement: the officer had 
been confronted with an emergency that threatened the destruction of 
evidence, since “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to dimin-
ish shortly after drinking stops.”15 Still, the Court emphasized that the 
ultimate constitutionality of such warrantless blood draws depends equal-
ly on whether the test chosen to measure blood alcohol content is a rea-
sonable one and whether that test is performed in a reasonable manner.16 
Given these latter caveats, there is concededly some merit to the ar-
gument that, under Schmerber, any chemical analysis of blood need be 
“reasonable,” irrespective of whether a warrant authorizing specific test-
ing has been procured or not.17 However, such a conclusion is by no 
means irrefutable given that the defendant in Schmerber did not attempt 
to distinguish the extraction of his blood from its subsequent testing; he 
                                                        
 10. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966)). 
 11. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 12. Id. at 770. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 758, 772. 
 15. Id. at 770; see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“[T]he need ‘to pre-
vent the imminent destruction of evidence’ has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for 
a warrantless search.”). 
 16. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
 17. Assuming that analysis of the blood does indeed qualify as a search to begin with, techni-
cians could not, for instance, screen a sample for sexually transmitted diseases in a DUI investiga-
tion. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 388 (2009) (“[T]he reasonableness 
of a search’s scope depends . . . on whether it is limited to the area that is capable of concealing the 
object of the search.”). For commentary on this reasonableness standard, see infra Part III. 
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challenged only the constitutionality of the former.18 Accordingly, there 
was no justiciable basis on which to reach the question of blood testing 
as a discrete Fourth Amendment event.19 
The Court seemingly clarified its interpretation of the relationship 
between the extraction of biological samples and their subsequent analy-
sis in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n.20 Skinner concerned 
the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970, which “authorize[d] 
the Secretary of Transportation to ‘prescribe, as necessary, appropriate 
rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safe-
ty.’”21 Pursuant to the statute, the Federal Railroad Administration prom-
ulgated regulations that mandated the blood and urine analysis of railroad 
employees involved in certain accidents.22 The issue presented was 
“whether these regulations violate[d] the Fourth Amendment.”23 
Before reaching the merits of the case, however, the Court offered a 
primer on what it perceived to be uncontested Fourth Amendment law: 
We have long recognized that a “compelled intrusio[n] into the 
body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed 
a Fourth Amendment search. In light of our society’s concern for 
the security of one’s person, it is obvious that this physical intru-
sion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of priva-
cy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing 
chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a 
further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests.24 
Interestingly, a number of scholars have taken Skinner at its word 
and accepted a literal interpretation of the “further invasion” language as 
set forth in the opinion.25 This would seem to counsel in favor of requir-
ing a separate warrant for testing in order to safeguard the privacy inter-
ests at stake in the continued intrusion. Viewed in context, however, the 
                                                        
 18. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766. 
 19. Id. at 771. 
 20. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 21. Id. at 606; see also 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1970) (repealed 1994). 
 22. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 616 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 25. See, e.g., Leigh M. Harlan, Note, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to 
Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 192 (2004) (“[The Supreme Court] has 
expressly recognized that the initial procurement of a biological sample and the subsequent analysis 
of the sample are two conceptually distinct events necessitating independent Fourth Amendment 
analyses.”); Natalie Logan, Note, Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights 
and Continued Seizure Under the DNA Act, 92 B.U. L. REV. 733, 739–40 (2012) (“Collection of [a 
biological] sample . . . constitutes a seizure of the person’s tissue and accompanying ‘DNA finger-
print.’ Once collected, the analysis of the sample constitutes a second, independent search of the 
seized sample.”). 
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Court in Skinner did not strictly apply this principle to the legal issue 
under consideration—namely, whether the FRSA’s regulations directly 
contravened the Fourth Amendment.26 Rather, given the safety concerns 
associated with rail travel, it resolved the case under the superseding 
“special needs” exception to the warrant requirement.27 As in Schmerber, 
the Skinner Court came nowhere close to adjudicating whether the test-
ing of a blood sample is a distinct Fourth Amendment event relative to 
its initial lawful procurement, rendering the “further invasion” language 
dicta. 
Another remark from the Court without the force of precedent has 
spoken more directly to the significance of biological testing. Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston concerned a state hospital’s testing of urine samples 
of pregnant women suspected of drug abuse where those patients had 
consented to providing such samples as a condition to receiving obstetric 
care.28 The Court ultimately invalidated the hospital’s policy as a surrep-
titious prosecutorial scheme rather than a valid exercise of the “special 
needs” exception to the warrant requirement.29 However, Justice Scalia 
dissented to emphasize the importance of the patients’ consent in provid-
ing the urine samples: 
There is only one act that could conceivably be regarded as a search 
of petitioners in the present case: the taking of the urine sample. . . . 
Some would argue, I suppose, that testing of the urine is prohibited 
by some generalized privacy right “emanating” from the “penum-
bras” of the Constitution (a question that is not before us); but it is 
not even arguable that the testing of urine that has been lawfully 
obtained [through consent] is a Fourth Amendment search.30 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Ferguson suggests that the more con-
servative members of the Court are unlikely to be receptive to attempts at 
dissociating the analysis of a biological sample from its initial extraction 
by lawful warrant or consent. Decisions such as Schmerber and Skinner, 
meanwhile, are comparatively less instructive in gleaning the Court’s 
potential treatment of the issue under the Fourth Amendment. But, as the 
discussion below illustrates, the lower federal and state courts have not 
waited for the Supreme Court to render a decisive opinion before reach-
ing a consensus that a state can lawfully exploit testing of a blood sample 
in its possession without secondary judicial authorization. 
                                                        
 26. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. 
 27. Id. at 633. For a recent articulation of the “special needs” doctrine, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011). 
 28. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70–74 (2001). 
 29. Id. at 85–86. 
 30. Id. at 92–93 (emphasis in second sentence added). 
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III. TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in resolving the 
Fourth Amendment significance of chemical analysis of a biological 
sample, national search and seizure jurisprudence is largely in agree-
ment: No express judicial authorization is needed to analyze a suspect’s 
blood (or any other biological sample) once it has already been lawfully 
procured.31 
United States v. Snyder represents a prototypical application of this 
principle by the Ninth Circuit.32 In Snyder, the defendant’s blood was 
drawn without his consent at the scene of an automobile accident after 
the attending officers suspected he was intoxicated.33 A blood test per-
formed two days later revealed that his blood alcohol level was over the 
legal limit.34 Appealing his DUI conviction, Snyder acknowledged that 
the blood draw at the scene had been constitutionally permissible under 
Schmerber but “challenge[d] the subsequent warrantless analysis of the 
[blood] sample as an unreasonable search.”35 
The court found this argument unavailing. “The flaw in Snyder’s 
argument,” it reasoned, was his “attempt to divide his arrest, and the sub-
sequent extraction and testing of his blood, into too many separate inci-
dents, each to be given independent significance for [F]ourth 
[A]mendment purposes.”36 In the court’s view, “Schmerber viewed the 
seizure and separate search of the blood as a single event.”37 According-
ly, under well-settled Supreme Court precedent, it was able to conclude 
that the “performance of a blood-alcohol test has no independent signifi-
cance for [F]ourth [A]mendment purposes.”38 
As discussed in the preceding section, Schmerber’s treatment of the 
issue in Snyder was effectively nonexistent due to the fact that the de-
fendant in that case did not challenge the constitutionality of the state’s 
blood analysis. Therefore, any extension of Schmerber in this respect 
rests on tenuous grounds. Given the lack of a search warrant for the de-
fendant’s blood in either case, neither Schmerber nor Snyder are instruc-
                                                        
 31. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 4.10(e) (5th ed. 2013) (“[I]t is generally understood that a lawful seizure of apparent evidence of 
crime pursuant to a search warrant carries with it a right to test or otherwise examine the seized 
materials to ascertain or enhance their evidentiary value . . . .”). 
 32. United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 33. Id. at 472. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 473. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 474. 
 38. Id. 
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tive in terms of what should be expected of a magistrate who authorizes 
the procurement of such a sample. 
Nonetheless, several state decisions have unequivocally advanced 
the reasoning adopted in Snyder for the proposition that a defendant’s 
privacy interests in his or her blood do not survive past the point of initial 
extraction by law enforcement. For example, in People v. King, a New 
York court offered the following interpretation of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence with regard to the testing of biological samples: 
It is . . . clear that once a person’s blood sample has been obtained 
lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy claims or unreason-
able search and seizure arguments with respect to the use of that 
sample. Privacy concerns are no longer relevant once the sample 
has already lawfully been removed from the body, and the scientific 
analysis of a sample does not involve any further search and seizure 
of a defendant’s person.39 
Similarly, in State v. Hauge, the Supreme Court of Hawaii looked to na-
tionwide trends in search and seizure cases to reach an identical conclu-
sion about any privacy interests the defendant may have retained in the 
biological sample seized by law enforcement in the case at bar: 
Our review of the case law of other jurisdictions indicates that 
the appellate courts of several states have ruled that expectations 
of privacy in lawfully obtained blood samples . . . are not objec-
tively reasonable by “society’s” standards. Specifically, a num-
ber of jurisdictions have held on analogous facts that once a 
blood sample and DNA profile is lawfully procured from a de-
fendant, no privacy interest persists in either the sample or the 
profile.40 
While the conclusions reached in King and Hauge are certainly repre-
sentative of prevailing state approaches, some decisions have made min-
imal inroads in articulating limitations on a state’s ability to conduct test-
ing of a biological sample in its possession. 
State v. Sanders, an unpublished case from Wisconsin, is such an 
example.41 In Sanders, police obtained a search warrant for the defend-
ant’s blood after his involvement in a serious automobile collision.42 The 
warrant “[did] not limit—or even address—what the police could or 
could not do with the blood once it was drawn.”43 Although there was 
                                                        
 39. People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 40. State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003). 
 41. State v. Sanders, Nos. 93-2284-CR & 93-2286-CR, 1994 WL 481723 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 
8, 1994). 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Id. at *5. 
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merely probable cause to suspect that Sanders had been under the influ-
ence of alcohol at the time of the collision, his blood was tested for the 
presence of tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) in addition to being analyzed 
for its alcohol content.44 The results indicated an illegal degree of intoxi-
cation on both counts.45 
Sanders argued on appeal that “testing his blood for the presence of 
drugs, as opposed to alcohol alone, exceeded the scope of the search war-
rant and thus was itself an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.”46 
Sanders’s position relied primarily on the “further invasion” language 
from Skinner.47 However, the court found Skinner unpersuasive for many 
of the same reasons voiced earlier—the opinion’s reference to a “further 
invasion” is, at best, dicta in a “special needs” exception case that was 
resolved on different principles.48 Instead, the court maintained that 
“once the police came into lawful possession of the blood samples, 
Sanders lost any expectation of privacy he may have had in them, at least 
insofar as testing for intoxicants . . . [was] concerned.”49 
The court also felt compelled to respond to Sanders’s contention 
that the rule being adopted “open[ed] the door to allow testing of blood 
for any purpose the state might elect to pursue.”50 In rebuttal, the court 
stated that “the ‘reasonableness standard’ of the Fourth Amendment 
would protect against the significant, but unnecessary, invasion of a de-
fendant’s privacy interests that subjecting his blood to unrestricted test-
ing for every fact that it could possibly reveal would entail.”51 
However, there is a troubling obstacle to the endorsement of such a 
reasonableness standard—by its terms, it delegates to the state the task of 
policing itself when it comes to the testing of blood and other biological 
samples. Dispensing with the warrant requirement plainly means that 
there is no initial opportunity for a neutral magistrate to evaluate the ne-
cessity of the state’s testing; as such, testing of the sample only stands to 
be deemed unreasonable by a court after the fact (i.e., after the defendant 
may have been adversely impacted within the criminal justice system).52 
                                                        
 44. Id. at *1–2. 
 45. Id. at *2. 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. at *4; see supra Part II. 
 48. Sanders, 1994 WL 481723, at *5. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at *5 n.5 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Such consequences are not difficult to imagine: a defendant’s name and reputation may be 
tarnished by the mere fact of an indictment alone, even where the charge is later dismissed because 
of Fourth Amendment violations. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) 
(“The impact of an indictment is on the reputation or liberty of a man. The same is true where a 
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The Supreme Court has previously stressed that even when law enforce-
ment officials take it upon themselves to ensure the “reasonableness” of 
their search without first deferring to a magistrate, there is nonetheless 
little chance of the officers conducting a search that comports with the 
Fourth Amendment, absent certain exceptions.  
In Katz,53 the Government urged that “because [its agents] did no 
more . . . than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanc-
tion,” their warrantless search of the defendant should be “retroactively 
validate[d].”54 Yet the court was unambiguous in proclaiming that it had 
“never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably 
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined 
their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.”55 
Accordingly, there is little doubt that self-imposed restraints on state 
conduct are inimical with the protections contemplated by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Other decisions have treaded a slightly different path in announcing 
that it is only the noncontraband contents of blood that an individual can 
assert a legitimate privacy interest in after its lawful extraction. For in-
stance, in State v. Price, police sought and obtained a warrant for the de-
fendant’s blood after his involvement in a fatal car crash.56 Although the 
accompanying affidavit to the warrant only contemplated analyzing 
Price’s blood alcohol content, the warrant itself “did not specify what 
tests could be conducted.”57 The tests results came back positive for the 
presence of THC.58 
Like the defendant in Sanders, Price challenged the testing of his 
blood for THC as “outside the scope of the warrant.”59 However, the 
court relied on Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that any in-
terest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate.60 As such, 
the court was bound to hold that “once a blood sample has been legiti-
mately seized, the individual from whom that sample was taken has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contraband contents of his 
blood.”61 Although the court conceded that testing Price’s blood, by con-
                                                                                                                            
prosecutor files an information charging violations of the law. The harm to property and business 
can . . . be incalculable by the mere institution of proceedings.”). 
 53. See supra text accompanying note 2.  
 54. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967). 
 55. Id. at 356–57 (emphasis added). 
 56. State v. Price, 270 P.3d 527, 529 (Utah 2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 529–30. 
 60. Id. at 530 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 70–71. 
 61. Id. 
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trast, for “HIV status, DNA information, blood type, or other private 
medical facts . . . would have infringed upon a legitimate privacy inter-
est,” it noted conclusively that this did not happen in the present matter.62 
Similarly, in State v. Loveland, the defendant was searched after be-
ing detained for fleeing an officer, and marijuana was discovered on his 
person.63 After booking Loveland into a detention center, officers pro-
cured a urine sample without his consent.64 The sample tested positive 
for both marijuana and cocaine, which officers ostensibly could not have 
suspected would be found.65 Loveland subsequently argued that the test 
for cocaine was an unreasonable search and seizure because it was un-
substantiated by probable cause.66 
The court remarked, “While the State urges us to find that Loveland 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sample generally, we 
restrain ourselves to a more limited holding.”67 As in Price, the court 
ultimately resorted to articulating the principle that possession of contra-
band is irreconcilable with the sort of legitimate privacy interests safe-
guarded by the Fourth Amendment.68 In Loveland’s case, that rule dictat-
ed that “testing to determine whether [his urine] contained traces of co-
caine compromise[d] no legitimate privacy interest.”69 
Though the noncontraband approach adopted in Price and Loveland 
appears to make an important concession towards defendants’ privacy 
rights, it is ultimately as unavailing as the reasonableness standard en-
dorsed in Sanders. To expose the fundamental infirmity in this argument, 
however, it is first necessary to consult the Supreme Court precedent be-
ing invoked as authority for a Fourth Amendment exception. 
Both Price and Loveland rested heavily on Illinois v. Caballes in 
declaring that the defendants could not maintain a legitimate privacy in-
terest in the contraband contents of their blood.70 Caballes was con-
cerned with neither search warrants nor blood testing, but a challenge to 
the constitutionality of drug sniffs conducted outside the exteriors of ve-
hicles pulled over for reasons unrelated to narcotics interdiction.71 Reject-
                                                        
 62. Id. 
 63. State v. Loveland, 696 N.W.2d 164, 164 (S.D. 2005). 
 64. Id. The record is unclear as to the exact procedure by which the sample was obtained; there 
is no mention in the case of a search warrant. 
 65. Id. at 165. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 167. 
 70. See State v. Price, 270 P.3d 527, 530 (Utah 2012) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
408 (2005)); Loveland, 696 N.W.2d at 166–67 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 
(2005)). 
 71. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 
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ing defendant Caballes’s argument that probable cause related to his pos-
session of marijuana was needed to authorize a dog sniff after his vehicle 
had been detained, the Court stated: 
We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be 
deemed “legitimate,” and thus, governmental conduct that only re-
veals the possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate pri-
vacy interest.” This is because the expectation “that certain facts 
will not come to the attention of the authorities” is not the same as 
an interest in “privacy that society is prepared to consider reasona-
ble.”72 
At first blush, transposing the logic of Caballes into blood testing 
cases appears eminently reasonable. After all, is it not the case that a de-
fendant can “possess” contraband—such as illegal narcotics—in his 
bloodstream? The answer, as it turns out, is less clear than initial pre-
sumptions might suggest. 
The conventional legal understanding of “possession” is not always 
amenable to being applied in contexts where an individual has narcotics 
in his system.73 While precise statutory definitions may differ from state 
to state, one North Carolina appellate court surveying the case law con-
cluded that, in most jurisdictions, “a positive drug test alone cannot sup-
port a conviction for possession.”74 A significant number of precedents 
bear out that conclusion, with fairly consistent justifications among 
them.75 
Traditionally, legal “possession” requires an individual’s control 
and knowledge of the property in question.76 In State v. Flinchpaugh, the 
Kansas Supreme Court adeptly explained why both of these elements are 
lacking for possession purposes when narcotics are in a defendant’s 
                                                        
 72. Id. at 408–09 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 
(1984). 
 73. One dictionary definition of “possession” explains that it is “the right under which one may 
exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to 
the exclusive use of a material object.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (10th ed. 2014). 
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bloodstream.77 With regard to control, the court reasoned that once a drug 
has been assimilated into the body, “the power of [a] person to control, 
possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end.”78 Simply put, “[t]he 
ability to control the drug is beyond human capabilities.”79 As for 
knowledge of the presence of a drug, the court stated that it would be 
untenable to ever infer that the drug had been willfully consumed—
rather, it “might have been injected involuntarily, or introduced by arti-
fice, into the defendant’s system.”80 
As Flinchpaugh illustrates, imputing possession to an individual 
who has narcotics in his bloodstream is fraught with obstacles.81 This 
makes Price and Loveland’s reliance on Caballes particularly unconvinc-
ing. In Caballes, the defendant obviously “possessed” the marijuana that 
officers discovered as a result of the drug sniff; it was in the trunk of his 
car and thus easily susceptible to being moved or transported at his dis-
cretion.82 Not so with the defendants in Price and Loveland, who had no 
way to manipulate the drugs in their systems. Nor could knowledge of 
the drugs be attributed to them absent corroborating evidence that they 
had purposefully ingested the narcotics. In the final analysis, there is in-
sufficient symmetry between Caballes and the Fourth Amendment issues 
presented in blood analysis cases for a reviewing court to find the juxta-
position instructive. 
IV. WASHINGTON’S MARTINES DECISION 
Against the preceding backdrop of cases stands State v. Martines, a 
Washington Court of Appeals decision that—prior to its review by the 
state supreme court—was a jurisprudential anomaly in the realm of 
Fourth Amendment case law.83  
In Martines, state patrol officers obtained a warrant for the defend-
ant’s blood after taking him into custody on suspicion of drunk driving.84 
The warrant failed to make any mention of the testing that the State in-
tended to perform on the sample.85 The test results indicated that 
Martines’s blood alcohol level was significantly above the legal limit; 
however, beyond this preliminary finding that had been the subject of the 
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 78. Id. at 211. 
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affidavit for probable cause, Martines’s blood was also tested for narcot-
ics, which revealed the presence of Valium.86 
Martines maintained on appeal that because the warrant authorizing 
the extraction of his blood failed to explicitly authorize its subsequent 
testing, “the results should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal 
search.”87 The State responded that blood is “a thing to be seized, not a 
place to be searched,” and once a blood sample is lawfully seized, the 
individual whose blood has been seized no longer has a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in it.88 
The Martines court disagreed with the State, holding that “the test-
ing of blood intrudes upon a privacy interest that is distinct from the pri-
vacy interests in bodily integrity and personal security that are invaded 
by a physical penetration of the skin.”89 Interestingly, the court relied 
heavily on Skinner90 to discern that “the testing of the blood constitutes a 
second search.”91 As such, a separate warrant thereafter became required 
for chemical analysis in Washington.92 The court also contemplated 
whether Martines had “knowingly exposed” the valuable information 
contained in his blood, stating: “Blood is not like a voice or a face or 
handwriting or fingerprints . . . . The personal information contained in 
blood is hidden and highly sensitive. Testing . . . can reveal not only evi-
dence of intoxication, but also evidence of disease, pregnancy, and ge-
netic family relationships.”93 
However, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, disregarding 
Skinner entirely and applying a “commonsense reading” to the warrant to 
hold that the document “authorized not merely the drawing and storing 
of a blood sample but also the toxicology tests performed to detect the 
presence of drugs or alcohol.”94 With comparatively little analysis, the 
court concluded that because “[t]he purpose of the warrant was to draw a 
sample of blood from Martines to obtain evidence of DUI,” it would not 
be “sensible to read the warrant in a way that stops short of obtaining that 
evidence.”95 Perhaps most importantly, the court did opine that testing of 
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a defendant’s blood does have to be “confined to the finding of probable 
cause,” although it offered no direct authority for that proposition.96 
While the Court of Appeals’s willingness to treat the testing of 
blood as a distinct Fourth Amendment event in Martines is commenda-
ble, its express reliance on Skinner as irrefutable authority supporting the 
testing-as-search paradigm is questionable.97 In the ensuing sections, I 
depart from adherence to the Court of Appeals’s reasoning in order to 
take up several justifications for why Martines’s reversal by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court will work substantial prejudice to the Fourth 
Amendment rights of accused citizens. I consider not only why the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against general warrants supports a 
biological/nonbiological distinction with regard to items to be seized by 
warrant, but also specific privacy concerns associated with state DNA 
databases. 
V. A NEW PARADIGM FOR TESTING OF BLOOD SAMPLES UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
In arguing that the testing of a lawfully-procured blood sample con-
stitutes a distinct Fourth Amendment event, it is first necessary to revisit 
the two-pronged Katz test elaborated in Part I. As the Supreme Court 
established in Katz, Fourth Amendment concerns are only implicated 
when an individual displays a subjective expectation of privacy, and that 
expectation is one that society is readily prepared to accept as “reasona-
ble.”98 
Under this inquiry, it is perhaps self-evident that the primary point 
of contention in most challenges to a search or seizure will inhere in the 
determination of whether the asserted privacy interest is congruous with 
societal norms. On the one hand, it is plausible to contend that an indi-
vidual’s privacy interests are significantly diminished when his person or 
property is legitimately seized by law enforcement.99 On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the countervailing concern 
that “chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of 
private medical facts about an [individual], including whether he or she 
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic”—facts that may be extraneous to any 
criminal investigative aims.100 This latter concern is of paramount im-
portance because, as one scholar has observed, “a person has no reason 
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to know much of the information that will be revealed when [a biological 
sample containing DNA] is analyzed. [She] has little to no discretion 
over what information is stored in her body and likely has 
not . . . evaluated that information herself.”101 Thus, it appears reasonable 
under Katz to conclude that society is prepared to recognize at least some 
privacy expectations in a biological sample retained by law enforcement 
officials—not least because biological material should plainly be regard-
ed as sui generis within the greater taxonomy of evidence. Under that 
analysis, it necessarily follows that the testing of a biological sample is a 
discrete Fourth Amendment search. 
Many dismissals of the testing-as-search paradigm have been predi-
cated on the notion that a biological sample should be treated as any oth-
er type of evidence for the purposes of constitutional analysis.102 In other 
words, this approach construes “evidence” in a monolithic sense that 
serves as an indiscriminate shelter for anything gathered pursuant to a 
warrant over the course of a criminal investigation. Consider, for exam-
ple, the approach embraced by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in the 
following case. 
In State v. VanLaarhoven, the defendant submitted the familiar ar-
gument that “his blood sample, once obtained, [could not] be analyzed 
for evidentiary purposes without obtaining a second search warrant.”103 
Rebutting the merits of VanLaarhoven’s claim, the court looked to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Petrone as guiding prec-
edent.104 Petrone concerned a suppression challenge to photographs de-
veloped by law enforcement after the 35mm negatives had been seized 
pursuant to a warrant.105 The thrust of Petrone’s Fourth Amendment ar-
gument was that “the process of developing the films [went] beyond the 
authority of the warrant.”106 Holding that officers did not need a separate 
warrant to develop the film, the court suggested that officials “simply 
used technological aids to assist them in determining whether items with-
in the scope of the warrant were in fact evidence of the crime alleged.”107 
Surely, the court went on, Petrone “could not have objected had the dep-
uties used a magnifying glass to examine lawfully seized documents or 
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had enlarged a lawfully seized photograph in order to examine [it] in 
greater detail.”108 
VanLaarhoven invoked Petrone for the unsurprising proposition 
that examination of evidence—any evidence, biological or otherwise—
seized pursuant to a warrant does not require secondary judicial authori-
zation.109 However, the court in VanLaarhoven failed to take account of 
the fact that undeveloped photo negatives and the contents of an individ-
ual’s blood implicate vastly different privacy concerns. The functional 
result of its holding was to create an equivalency between biological evi-
dence and tangible, physical evidence that leaves little room for nuanced 
analysis where it is most needed. 
The following concerns raised by the State of Washington before 
the Court of Appeals in Martines also illustrate the same unwillingness 
to confront the unique characteristics of a defendant’s blood: 
If judicial authorization is required to test blood for alcohol or 
drugs, even once that blood is lawfully in police custody, there is 
no principled reason to conclude it would not be needed for a 
host of other forensic testing as well: to test controlled substanc-
es seized from a car during an inventory search; to test[-]fire a 
handgun to determine its operability or to determine whether 
bullet casings at the scene of a shooting were fired from the same 
gun . . . ; to analyze fingerprints left at a crime scene . . . ; [or] to 
translate writings from a foreign language into English . . . .110 
Implicit in this reasoning is the fear that, taken to its purportedly logical 
conclusion, the testing-as-search paradigm would emasculate the effi-
ciency of law enforcement practices.111 But, contrary to the State’s asser-
tion, there is indeed a “principled reason” against extending this ap-
proach to nonbiological evidence. Simply put, there is only so much in-
vestigative information that can be gleaned from test-firing a handgun, 
analyzing fingerprints,112 or translating a piece of writing. Even before 
police intervention into his affairs, a criminal suspect would be able to 
speculate about the type and extent of information that law enforcement 
could gather against him from seizing such evidence. For example, a 
suspect who fires a gun in the commission of a felony is likely aware that 
the gun might be traced back to him through either fingerprints or ballis-
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tics testing. Yet the investigative inquiry in this particular example is 
circumscribed by certain practical limitations: police would not be able 
to discern the suspect’s hereditary history or related medical information 
from the weapon alone. This is evidently not the case with biological 
information, about which a suspect might remain profoundly ignorant 
when it comes to the nature and scope of testing that the state might per-
form, and which the state has far more diverse technological resources to 
exploit in doing so.113 
A corollary justification for distinguishing between biological and 
nonbiological evidence lies in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against general warrants.114 Recall that general warrants are inimical with 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections because a “general, exploratory 
rummaging” of a suspect’s person or property has been held constitu-
tionally impermissible.115 This is precisely the language alluded to by the 
Court of Appeals in Martines when it held that “the requirement to ob-
tain a particularized warrant for blood testing will prevent the State from 
rummaging among the various items of information contained in a blood 
sample for evidence unrelated to drunk driving.”116 
By contrast, a Fourth Amendment paradigm of blood testing that 
does not recognize the need for express judicial authorization seeks to 
legitimize general warrants. This is so because “blood is a substance 
whose evidentiary value lies in its components,” and it “has no probative 
value in itself.” 117 Instead, “it must be examined for its evidentiary value 
to be understood.”118 Acknowledging this reality makes it clear that 
blood is more akin to a “place” to be searched than a “thing” to be 
seized. No one would contest that a warrant authorizing the search of 
John Doe’s home “for evidence of any and all crimes” could not pass 
constitutional muster. The same principle holds true here, given that 
blood is simply a repository for a myriad of potentially incriminating 
evidence sought by the State. An approach that advocates essentially un-
restricted testing is therefore compromised by a fatal constitutional in-
firmity. This concern about general warrants is particularly critical in 
light of the fact that “[a]s technology advances, more meaningful infor-
mation will be extractable from . . . genetic material . . . . [T]he only 
practical limit on information that can be extracted from biological sam-
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ples are currently-available analysis techniques and our knowledge of 
what genetic variations mean.”119 
In sum, jurisdictions adopting the testing-as-search paradigm 
should proceed as follows: When a magistrate is faced with a petition for 
a search warrant attempting to seize biological evidence (such as blood) 
from a criminal suspect, the warrant that issues should explicitly incorpo-
rate the scope of testing authorized on that sample. To obviate the gen-
eral warrant problem, such restrictions need to be narrowly tailored in 
light of the supporting affidavit of probable cause presented. In the alter-
native, the State could seek a second warrant after it has collected the 
biological evidence in question. Because biological evidence is sui gene-
ris, this practice need not be replicated under circumstances when the 
object of the warrant is nonbiological.120 
For illustrative purposes, consider a relatively straightforward ex-
ample: John Doe is pulled over for driving erratically late at night. Dur-
ing the encounter, the attending officer notices that Doe’s breath smells 
strongly of liquor. A search of his criminal history reveals prior convic-
tions for DUI. When the officer shines her flashlight inside the car, she 
notices a small plastic bag of white powder lying in plain view on the 
passenger seat. Doe subsequently fails a field sobriety test, and the of-
ficer confirms that the plastic bag contains cocaine. If the officer seeks a 
warrant for extraction of Doe’s blood, the magistrate should be satisfied 
that probable cause exists to authorize extraction of the blood for evi-
dence of driving under the influence. But, on its face, the warrant should 
also be narrowly tailored to specifically permit testing only for blood 
alcohol and cocaine. Chemical analysis outside these boundaries (such as 
for marijuana or any other intoxicant police may wish to find) should be 
strictly prohibited. 
I would stress that, as a policy matter, there is effectively no reason 
for law enforcement officials to seek a separate warrant authorizing test-
ing distinct from the warrant authorizing procurement of the sample. The 
two mandates can—and should—be incorporated in the same document. 
This is the better practice, at least in theory, because it avoids compound-
ing administrative burdens; as the Supreme Court observed in a recent 
case, “[w]arrants inevitably take some time for police officers or prose-
cutors to complete and for magistrate judges to review.”121 Accordingly, 
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the State should not complain of undue delays under the testing-as-search 
paradigm, unless it determines that it needs to analyze a biological sam-
ple for a different purpose than originally contemplated. Under those cir-
cumstances, a second warrant supported by sufficient probable cause 
would indeed be necessary. 
In the following section, I provide an imperative for the testing-as-
search paradigm by offering some speculation as to the privacy interests 
we stand to undermine by failing to adopt changes in nationwide search 
and seizure jurisprudence with regard to testing of biological samples. 
VI. DNA DATABANKS AND RELATED PRIVACY CONCERNS 
The need for restrictions on the testing of a defendant’s blood car-
ries particular importance in the realm of DNA databanks. 
DNA analysis has been hailed as “one of the most important ad-
vances in forensic science.”122 Because the presence of genetic markers 
on certain chromosomes is highly unique, DNA testing allows police to 
reliably compare the genetic profile of a known person with a genetic 
profile left at a crime scene by an unknown individual.123 DNA can be 
derived from a wide variety of bodily sources, including blood, saliva, 
semen, or shed skin cells.124 Moreover, forensic technology has advanced 
such that “[o]nly a miniscule amount of biological material is needed to 
produce [a] DNA profile.”125 
A DNA databank is a storehouse of genetic records that law en-
forcement agencies use for criminal identification purposes.126 Every 
state in the union has “passed statutes requiring convicted offenders to 
provide DNA samples for inclusion in a national database of identifying 
profiles.”127 That national databank of genetic profiles is known as the 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and is overseen by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.128 CODIS is subdivided into local, state, and 
national levels; after a profile enters the database at the local level, it then 
becomes accessible by state and nationwide searches.129 The CODIS 
databank contained more than 11,628,300 profiles as of September 
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2012.130 A complete match between a genetic profile in CODIS and an 
unknown DNA sample points to the individual associated with the 
CODIS profile.131 Meanwhile, a partial match “may identify a family 
member as the source of crime scene DNA because related persons in-
herit their DNA profiles from the same family tree.”132 
Even where an individual is never prosecuted or convicted of a 
crime, a significant number of states now have statutory schemes author-
izing the warrantless DNA sampling of certain arrestees.133 The constitu-
tionality of such laws has been vigorously debated, and a discussion on 
the merits is outside the scope of this Note.134 
However, at the nexus of biological evidence testing and the prolif-
eration of DNA databanks, there are at least three important privacy con-
cerns that warrant brief scholarly inquiry. In raising these issues, I am 
primarily concerned with the State’s extraction of a DNA profile pursu-
ant to a warrant that does not restrict the type of testing that may be per-
formed on a blood sample. 
First, and perhaps most obviously, “[i]f a person’s genetic identifi-
cation profile is created, that person can be implicated in future crimes 
and will constantly be compared to crime scene DNA samples, which 
some have referred to as lifelong ‘genetic surveillance.’”135 As some 
commentators have pointed out, federal courts have yet to specifically 
address the issue of whether any subsequent use of DNA profiles consti-
tutes an unreasonable search or violates an individual’s right to “informa-
tional privacy.”136 Nevertheless, it is easy to envisage the Fourth 
Amendment difficulties posed by a scenario in which a drunk driving 
suspect has blood drawn pursuant to a generalized warrant, the State ex-
tracts his DNA profile, and that profile subsequently incriminates him in 
a far more serious offense such as a homicide. 
Second, if DNA is subject to familial searching, to reveal other 
family relationships, the individual may feel responsible for subjecting 
his entire family to such genetic surveillance.137 Furthermore, “if a family 
member were to be subsequently prosecuted for a crime, that individual 
could feel responsible for implicating their family member.”138 Discon-
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certingly, relatives of the initial suspect might “find themselves eligible 
for the database based on nothing more than their relationship to a con-
victed offender.”139 
Finally, information about paternity could be used as evidence of 
statutory rape if the mother of the child is underage or as evidence in a 
civil case to require the father to pay child support.140 In addition, “gov-
ernment-conducted paternity testing could harm the mother if it keeps a 
man involved in her life whom she had hoped to avoid.”141 These issues 
could cause further familial disturbances to which—at present—
magistrates give virtually no deference when they issue warrants for the 
seizure of biological evidence without restricting its testing.142 
To concretize some of the privacy concerns discussed above, con-
sider the following hypotheticals. Although it must be conceded that they 
exist merely within the realm of the possible rather than the probable, 
these examples are nonetheless informed by the current state of the law. 
Assume that each takes place in a jurisdiction, such as Washington, 
where DNA extraction is not mandated by statute upon a defendant’s 
arrest.143 
A. Hypothetical #1 
The Gotham Police Department is investigating the grisly double 
murder of two women found shot to death in a hotel on the outskirts of 
town. Initially, there are few promising leads. However, the forensics 
team eventually manages to create two distinct genetic profiles from 
hairs discovered on the women’s bodies and on the linens of the beds in 
hotel room. 
One of the DNA profiles is a direct match to John Doe, a suburban 
man who had been arrested for drunk driving twelve years earlier after 
police suspected he was responsible for a multicar collision. At that time, 
police obtained a warrant to extract Doe’s blood and subsequently ana-
lyzed it for its alcohol content, which was technically over the legal limit. 
Pursuant to common practice, the police also created a DNA profile and 
added it to the state databank. Doe contested the DUI charge and was 
acquitted after his lawyer persuaded the jury that the forensic machinery 
had not been properly calibrated prior to testing and was thus unreliable. 
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The other DNA profile yields no positive identification. However, 
technicians are able to inform police detectives that the profile is that of a 
male individual who bears a familial relation to John Doe—possibly his 
brother. 
With this information in hand, police call Doe in for questioning 
and press him for answers about his involvement. Doe admits that he and 
his brother, Mark, had been out celebrating a recent promotion at his real 
estate firm on the night of the murders. At some point in the evening, 
when the pair were heavily inebriated and strolling along the waterfront, 
they were approached by the victims, who intimated that they were 
“working girls” and offered their services. On a whim, John and Mark 
followed them back to their hotel, but ultimately decided against doing 
anything and promptly left a few minutes after arriving. (Assume this 
account is factually correct.) 
Detectives are unconvinced. Considering the physical evidence far 
too inculpatory, John and Mark are both arrested and charged with mur-
der. The jury convicts John, partly on the basis of his statement to police. 
Mark is acquitted, but his marriage and family life are destroyed beyond 
repair. Because of the publicity from the trial, he is no longer able to find 
gainful employment and is ostracized from his community. 
B. Hypothetical #2 
The electoral race for Gotham City Attorney is one of the most hot-
ly contested in recent memory. The incumbent, John Doe, is fending off 
constant criticism in the media by his opponent, Mark Roe. The latest 
polls have City Attorney Doe trailing by a significant margin. 
Doe has been contemplating capitalizing on rumors that Roe fa-
thered a child with a mistress some years ago. He has avoided leaking the 
topic to the media because he knows it would be considered a desperate 
ploy if he could not substantiate the allegation. 
Late one night, Doe receives a phone call at home informing him 
that Roe has been arrested for drunk driving. After police obtain a war-
rant for Roe’s blood, Doe directs that a DNA profile for Roe be created 
as well. Before the blood can be tested for its alcohol content—but after 
the DNA profile is extracted—the sample is inadvertently contaminated 
and rendered useless. No charges are filed against Roe for the drunk 
driving incident. 
However, Doe’s campaign hires a private investigator to surrepti-
tiously obtain a discarded straw containing trace saliva from the girl they 
suspect to be Roe’s daughter. Further DNA comparison reveals that the 
girl is indeed related to Roe. After the sensational story is leaked to the 
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press, Roe is utterly discredited as a “family values” politician. Doe nar-
rowly avoids defeat and is re-elected. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has attempted to elaborate a testing-as-search paradigm 
under which the testing of biological evidence qualifies as a distinct 
Fourth Amendment event apart from its initial seizure. In doing so, I 
have proffered several justifications rooted in existing Supreme Court 
precedent, even though such arguments appear inconsistent with national 
trends in search and seizure jurisprudence.144 
Nonetheless, I have submitted that the sui generis nature of biologi-
cal evidence, coupled with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
general warrants, counsels in favor of magistrates explicitly restricting 
the variety of testing that may be performed on biological evidence in the 
same warrant authorizing its seizure. In most respects, this approach does 
not require a radical revision of existing privacy case law or principles; 
only the acknowledgement that the use of biological evidence poses far-
ther-reaching privacy dilemmas than may have originally been contem-
plated. The use of nationwide DNA databanks and attendant privacy 
concerns provide just one tangible example of the constitutional protec-
tions we stand to compromise (and currently are compromising) by fail-
ing to adopt the testing-as-search paradigm. 
 
                                                        
 144. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, I have placed principal reliance on Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which is a testament to the continuing legacy of a decision near-
ly half a century old. See supra Part I. The ensuing decades and future advances in technology will 
determine whether Katz remains a constitutional bulwark against privacy intrusions. 
